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Chapter 6 
THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY IN 
MOROCCO IN THE FACE OF URBAN GOVERNMENT 
 
Myriam CATUSSE and Lamia ZAKI* 
 
This chapter tackles the transformations that affect the elected local representatives of 
the Justice and Development Party (PJD - hizb al-‘adâla wa al-tanmiya) in Morocco, based 
on their term in office. Examining the profile and activities of the representatives of this 
new party on the political scene, it questions the transformations of its ideology, the 
political innovations that it brings about and finally, the internal and external constraints 
that weigh upon partisan life in Morocco.  
In June 2009, the City Council elections in Morocco have been held. The mandate that 
ended was singular on several accounts. In the first place, it inaugurated the institutional 
mechanisms of the new Communal Charter adopted in 2002, which re-divided the 
administrative map (districts) of the country upon a royal command for decentralization. 
Each of the big agglomerations that counted more than 500 000 inhabitants in the 1994 
census (Rabat, Sale, Casablanca, Fes, Marrakech, and Tangier), and that were until then 
divided into several urban communities, were “unified” into only one commune headed 
by a councilor. As a result the 27 communes of Casablanca were united into only one 
municipality that henceforth integrates 131 city councilors (they numbered 1147 before 
the Chart). The president of the city council acquired more prerogatives and 
commentators begin to call him “mayor” although the term does not figure in the text of 
the Charter.  
The 2003 local elections were also marked by the entry of the PJD, that ran for the first 
time in local elections. This political group was born at the end of the 1990s of a 
rapprochement between a party without a base, the Constitutional and Democratic 
Popular Movement (MPDC - al-haraka al-cha‘biyya al-dimuqrâtiyya wa al-dustûriyya) 
established in 1967 by an old statesman, minister and speaker of parliament, Abdelkrim 
al-Khatib, and the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR - al-islâh wa al-tawhîd). The 
latter itself is the heir of the Islamic Brotherhood (al-jamâ‘a al-islâmiyya) and the Islamic 
Youth (al-chabîba al-islâmiyya), two dissident movements that were undergoing a process 
of legalization during the 1990s (Tozy, 1999). On the Moroccan political scene of the 
2000‟s the PJD represents the principal legal party formation that proclaims an “Islamic” 
frame of reference. In contrast with the Justice and Charity association (al-‘adl wa al-ihsân), 
led by the charismatic opposition figure Cheikh Yassine, the PJD entered the formal 
political field since its formation and engaged in the electoral process by participating in 
the 2002 legislative elections.  
Comforted by the results it achieved in the parliament that year (the party came in third 
position with 42 seats out of 321) and following the Turkish AKP, the leaders and 
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militants of the party declared clearly their intentions to “take over the cities” in the 2003 
local elections. However, the Casablanca attacks on May 16, 2003 put a brake on the 
party‟s zeal, as it was accused by its rivals of being “morally responsible” for the political 
violence through the diffusion of a radical ideology among unprivileged sections of 
society. Some key figures went so far as to call for a ban on the party. Party officials 
therefore decided, without disappointing their party base, to limit candidatures to 18 % 
of electoral districts and to only half of the arrondissements in cities with more than 500,000 
inhabitants. None of the main party officials ran for elections, and very few PJD 
parliamentarians headed the electoral lists. Ultimately, the political party only supported 
3.48% of the candidates.  
Despite this limited participation, the PJD achieved a remarkable victory in the local 
elections, mainly by targeting the choice of candidatures. Arriving in 11th place in terms 
of elected representatives on the national level, the party is henceforth the second power 
of the kingdom on the scale of medium-sized cities (the party is effectively absent from 
rural districts). It won the presidency of 17 municipalities, among which some like 
Meknes and Temara were promoted to the frontline of the party‟s politics. In the large 
urban areas endowed with a city council, the PJD is largely represented but does not hold 
the presidency. Loyal to its strategy of auto-limitation (largely imposed by the central 
power), the party did not run for elections in Tangier or in Agadir, where results of the 
2002 legislative elections suggested that it could have realized good scores. In 
Casablanca, where the party ran for elections, it came first in seven arrondissements out of 
eight (the city counts 16).  
The 2003-2009 municipal mandate thus constituted a phase of political apprenticeship 
for the elected representatives of the PJD. In addition to the fact that it was often a first 
experience for them, they faced as the other elected representatives “teething troubles” in 
the application of the new Charter. They were equally forced to adjust to the constraints 
of an ambiguous decentralization: the central power effectively strengthened the local 
authorities while in parallel providing the devolved administration (autorités déconcentrée) – 
wali (regional prefect) and governors (prefects) – with the essential resources and 
prerogatives for urban action (De Miras, 2005). In this context, those who previously 
pretended to attack the cities today present themselves as pragmatic managers of the 
local in line with calls for good neoliberal governance. The religious reference becomes 
less marked or, more specifically, declines and readjusts to the local level, contingent 
upon the public and centered around some consensual watchwords (proximity, integrity, 
morality) (Smaoui, 2009). In fact, the PJD elected representatives tend to promote a 
“politics of doing”1, in a context of competitive clientelism and within the institutional 
and political limits of Moroccan decentralization. In sum, these new city managers 
present the characteristics of the good man, indeed those of a notable; however, they are 
also the apparatchiks, the real kingpins of the party on the local scale. 
 
A MANAGEMENT DISCOURSE 
 
                                               
1 We refer notably to the works of C. Goirand (2000) who shows that in Brazil, in the context of political 
liberalization, local notables engage themselves in “politics of doing,” attempting to win voters by doing 
more, better and differently than their rivals. See also L. Zaki (2005, chap. 7). 
In a December 2005 issue, Le Journal Hebdomadaire published a feature dedicated to the 
“pragmatism of the PJD mayors.” 2 The “realism of local politics” and the “efficiency of 
community management” of the newly elected representatives were presented as the 
“keys for success” of the party. After pronouncing the party responsible for the May 
2003 attacks, the national media – in addition to the international one3 – portrayed the 
elected representatives as sensible managers: the journalists who so dreaded a “shift to 
the Algerian experience” finally announced a more “Turkish transition .”  
According to them, the virtues of what PJD elected representatives perceive as Islamist 
political work relies less on know-how than on the will to do good and less on practical 
experience than on authenticity of commitment. For its part, the PJD holds a noticeably 
different viewpoint. The discourse of its representatives about the city draws on tested 
repertoires of urban management, and pragmatism takes first place in the decision-
making process on the ground4. This managerial “label” is at the heart of the 
legitimization strategies of the elected PJD representatives.5 When asked about their 
municipal track record, they highlight above all the good management of the budget: 
“We don‟t have distinctiveness in terms of themes or programs compared with others. 
Our distinctiveness is perhaps more the management.” (W., PJD elected representative 
of Casablanca, vice-president in charge of urbanism in the City Council, July 2008)  
It should be noted that the question of the political economy of the cities has figured on 
top of the public agenda since the mid-1990s. The new Charter transformed the rules of 
the game and the scale of redistribution of resources. The arrondissements that replaced the 
municipalities in the big cities have neither a legal personality nor a proper budget (their 
restricted funds are allocated by the City Council). They became limited to only three ill-
defined prerogatives: the so-called politics of proximity, the registry office and the issuing 
of construction permits for individual housing. As for the elected local representatives, 
they are generally accused of mismanaging public accounts (due to incompetence or 
corruption) and are often the object of financial audits (Catusse, 2001). In all cases, the 
economic dependency of the local representatives on the central authorities, the ultimate 
instance with power to authorize expenditure, remains decisive and only leaves a small 
margin for maneuvering.  
In reaction, the PJD representatives in the municipalities seek to prioritize their 
management responsibility, their capacity not only to keep accounts, but also to be 
accountable: “If there is an added value to the PJD, it is above all this enthusiasm and the 
will to have a healthy local management…without needing to disburse something to 
someone or to the party. Through transparency and for the good of the citizens. Not for 
personal interests or business issues. Trying to curb expenditures to the maximum, 
avoiding the squandering of public money and increasing the returns to the 
municipality.” (R. President of the Temara municipality, PJD, July 2008)  
Putting this management ethic into practice was often learned on the job and several 
elected representatives confess that they discovered the accounting rules at the beginning 
of their mandate. Moreover, they use the metaphor of the enterprise to describe the way 
their municipality functions. In the case of Temara, the PJD mayor underlines not only 
the “capacity for synergy” of the party with other majority groups of the city council, but 
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also the favorable collaboration of the municipality with public authorities, and in 
particular, with the prefecture. This “very participatory and consultative” approach 
allows him to develop a “strategy of planning” over ten years, thanks to recourse to a 
private chartered accountancy firm that drafted the action plan. The mayor recalls the 
restructuring efforts of the municipal administration that he launched in order to 
improve the functioning of what he calls his “municipality-enterprise.” The economic 
reason takes precedence over the social one in order to justify the need to decrease staff, 
but equally to outsource certain functions in order to respond more effectively to the 
increasing needs of the city. The loan received by the City Council from the local 
equipment funds contributed to the high growth of the municipality‟s budget (that was 
doubled in five years). Indeed, the recourse to credit could “provoke reactions among 
people [in the PJD] that were not working in the municipalities”6, but the mayor recalls 
that “there should be a certain flexibility in the values [of the party] in order to adapt to 
realities.”  
For him, it is this “spirit of entrepreneurship in the management of the city” that explains 
how Temara is the first municipality where a semi public company (SEM), specialized in 
the construction of social housing and urban infrastructure, was established with the 
Funds of Taxes and Management7. The municipality is the main shareholder, along with 
private or semi-public partners: “Different projects should be carried out without 
worrying too much about the social. For this reason the SEM is a good idea. (…) the 
staff of the municipality is not trained for this. The SEM was created for operational 
projects. And sometimes the municipality can also delegate mandated projects for the 
construction of markets [souks, covered or open], etc. The people of the municipality take 
care of the rest: the registry office…” (R.) 
Even though the initiative for technical projects or for the rationalization of public 
action, often relatively consensual, does not necessarily concern them, party officials do 
not hesitate to take on the implementation themselves: “the idea of one counter only (for 
the urbanism files), it was not us, but it was us who did it… we installed electronic tickets 
that indicate the date on which the commission will meet. The procedures now take 
fifteen days instead of six to seven months previously.” (W. PJD elected representative, 
Casablanca, July 2008) 
The economic argument therefore is omnipresent in the approach of the PJD 
representatives. In Casablanca, they are indignant that the law on competitiveness was 
flouted in an invitation for bids to set up a supermarket. In Fez and Rabat, where they 
are in the opposition, they request (with success) the intervention of the Audit Court in 
order to sanction bad management, including the embezzlement by two mayors. In their 
own municipalities, they work hard to attract investments while taking advantage of real 
estate: “Two big supermarkets were opened in the space of three months. Industries and 
services were set up. Temara is now the place where the square meter is the most 
expensive… (…) Sustainable sources of revenue for the city should be created.” (R.)  
Finally, particularly in Casablanca where the party is in the majority, it is opposed to the 
terms and conditions of renegotiation of the management contract for the city‟s water 
and electricity networks awarded since 1996 to Lydec (Lyonnaise des Eaux de 
Casablanca), subsidiary of Suez Environnement. An elected PJD representative 
                                               
6. The practice of usury, al-ribâ, is prohibited by Islam. This allowed the development, namely since the 
1990s, of a system of « Islamic finance » (Rousillon, 1989). 
7 A law is currently under preparation to organize the regulation of this kind of contract. 
specialized in this field for the sake of optimizing the management of public services. 
The review of the contract, signed in November 2008, was in this way partially controlled 
by the municipality thanks to the joint action of the PJD and the opposition, notably of 
the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), the main national and local rival of the 
PJD.  
The party officials seem to equally subscribe to the connection between public 
management and private management, a recurrent connection in Morocco during the 
years of liberalization (Catusse, 2008). So they praise the managerial qualities of the 
mayor of Casablanca. A manufacturer, an ex-president of the Chamber of Commerce, 
Industry and Services of Casablanca and an elected representative of the Constitutional 
Union, he developed his professional activities in Taroudant in the south of the country: 
“It is the first time in history that Casablanca has a president with a graduate background, 
an HEC graduate of Paris in 1974, who has been around. He was in business for twenty 
years as a big developer. It is those who have an adequate training, a great experience in 
career, in business, who can succeed. I don‟t understand how a president of an enterprise 
who went bankrupt can do politics. Because if he did not succeed in his private life, I do 
not see how he can succeed in his life in the community”. (O. PJD elected representative, 
Casablanca, July 2008)  
This management profile, however, can appear paradoxical on the part of a party that, as 
we will see, mobilizes very little in the world of business. Figureheads compensate this 
deficit, notably in Meknes, the biggest city in the kingdom governed by the PJD. In this 
city presented as a showcase for the party after the victory it realized in 2003, the new 
elected mayor is a rich property owner dubbed so by the party on the eve of the 
elections. His profile as a notable constituted at the time of the election a source of 
legitimacy for the PJD. But his management style of urban policy demonstrates his limits 
and his state of grace is wearing off today. His attitude in the City Council is questioned. 
In order to pocket the profits of the state-owned and autonomous urban transport that 
he hopes to privatize, he did not hesitate to bloc the circulation of state buses during 
almost two years, provoking local protest and royal intervention in 2005 in order to 
reactivate public transport. Defeated in his council, he is henceforth hardly supported by 
his party, which no longer presents the city as a PJD management laboratory, but 
controls with care the declarations of mayor of the city. Perhaps the attitude of the latter, 
insufficiently concerned with the social needs of his citizens, appeared too costly for 
party officials?  
 
THE EUPHEMIZATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISLAM  
 
The municipal practice of the PJD is equally marked by an euphemization of the 
relationship with religion. The political group moreover rarely makes reference to Arab 
Islamist parties overly associated with the Muslim Brothers (Zeghal, 2005) : it seems that 
a division of labor has been organized between the MUR and the PJD – the former 
taking charge of religious mobilization, the latter of political mobilization. If the religious 
reference is still present, other themes shape the rhetoric of the PJD, namely in terms of 
local governance (the “local questions” al-umûr al-mahalliyya – to recapture the words of 
its leaders).  
In the beginning of the millennium, the party opposed a parliament vote on a law 
regulating microcredit, which was and still is a booming sector. PJD leaders denounced 
the practice of usury as contrary to Shariaa law. In light of the municipal experience, 
however, the PJD councilors readjusted their position: “We are not against interest rates. 
To whom belongs the capitalist economy? To the Christians? To the private sector? We 
are against these ideas. They are outdated. All that is good for humanity is good for us.” 
(K., PJD elected parliamentarian, Mohammedia, July 2008) 
In 2003, certain party candidates considered establishing a public transportation system, 
separating men and women: “As in Tehran, this would allow everyone to sit.” (K., PJD 
elected representative, Moulay Yacoub, Rabat, February 2003) Today, the project seems 
barely feasible: “Society is not ready. We are not alone... We are working gradually. 
Maybe in the future?” (A., PJD elected representative, Sidi Bernoussi, Casablanca, July 
2008) “It is not in Islam. These are customs. Islamic thought has to be reformed. We 
have windows [of interpretation] to create in Islam.” (K., PJD elected parliamentarian, 
Mohammedia, July 2008)8 
As for the discourse on social justice, still present, it addresses first and foremost the way 
of condemning thieves and the corrupt who become rich at the expense of citizens. In 
fact, the public rhetoric of the local leaders of the PJD is deliberately flexible with 
relation to the Islamic frame of reference: “We are a party of religious identity, but our 
religious side is not required to emerge clearly in local management.” (A.)  
This relative distancing does not exhaust the complex connections that the party 
maintains with organizations like MUR that explicitly proclaims an Islamic mission. On 
the ground, buildings of the party host courses in Qur‟anic teaching, local associations 
close to the party organize scout activities for children (Smaoui, 2009) etc. Meanwhile, 
the concrete practice of municipal power leads the PJD to position itself in the Islamism 
arena by presenting itself as an antidote to forms of populism or radicalism using 
religious language. The party thus sets itself up as the defense against dangers presented 
as more serious than its own accession to power, not only for the secular camp but also 
more generally for the country. The political experience leads mainly to the 
implementation of pragmatic decisions. The PJD interviewees often evoked the Algerian 
scenario as a counter example. They stress that the PJD protects Morocco from 
terrorism, but also to suggest that if the Islamic Salvation Front (FSI) had been in power, 
“good sense” would have “naturally” pushed it towards normalized political strategies. 
In fact, the favorite themes of the elected PJD representatives remain more moral and 
negotiable than strictly religious. Several local episodes illustrate the absence of a clear 
party line on the question of morals. They reveal more the positions taken by individuals 
and sometimes those taken by elected representatives than they are a product of national 
campaigns launched in defense of intangible principles. In Khenifra in 2005, a 
declaration by the PJD mayor of the city on the subject of its reputation as a “historical 
place of prostitution” provoked public controversy: one thousand people descended on 
the street at the call of leftist movements to express their indignation. The debate, 
however, revolves less around the place of religion in the city than around the social and 
moral disturbance that prostitution could bring about. As for the protests, they are less 
about the use of morals in politics (save for the Moroccan Human Rights Association) 
than the stigma that such declarations could bring to the citizens of the city. In Ksar el 
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Kebir in 2007, another PJD municipality, the county court condemned six men for 
homosexuality. “Public manifestations of depravity must not take place in the state of the 
commander of the faithful,” affirmed the leader of the PJD group at the Assembly of 
Representatives. But it was in a PJD town hall in Meknes that a wine party was organized 
in 2007. The mayor of this city is also a jury member of a beauty contest. There is no 
agreement on the question of bars within the party anyway. In 2003, the PJD president 
of a municipality in Rabat affirmed: “I will not sign a document on the planning of the 
corniche if hotels and bars will be found there. Even if Auchan settles there and sells 
alcohol. Do not insist on this.” (K., Moulay Yacoub, Rabat) Today, the position of the 
party is clearly less uncompromising. In Meknes and Temara, the new PJD mayors boast 
about setting up hypermarkets in their municipalities, even if these markets sell alcohol. 
And while the PJD is opposed to the construction of a supermarket in a poor 
neighborhood of Casablanca, its representatives emphasize less the Muslim principle of 
prohibiting alcohol than the supermarket‟s incompatibility with consumers from 
working-class neighborhoods or slums. This condescending argument with regard to 
these populations demonstrates that the party does not necessarily make itself the porte-
parole of marginalized neighborhoods in the city as is claimed (Zaki, 2005) : “The 
question of wine was secondary. There are groceries there, shopkeepers that will be 
ruined by a supermarket, and then there are minors in Lahraouiyine, streets where even a 
police van cannot cross, it would be a catastrophe to bring wine to these people.” (L., 
PJD elected representative, Casablanca, July 2008) 
 
MANAGING DAILY PROBLEMS: THE DISPLAY OF MORAL CLIENTELISM  
 
The third side of the PJD local policy is the effort that its representatives expend towards 
citizens and their social needs. Access to the municipal council serves less to implement 
ambitious programs than to put in place forms of personalized “social and institutional 
mediation”9 with voters. In the end, the local elected representatives of the party develop 
an ideology of local public action not much different, at least in this respect, to that of 
the more traditional notables. They seem to have authority only to manage daily 
problems on the ground: “Day after day, I realized that the real place of the PJD was in 
the municipality. It is there where the citizen is, there that things have to be settled. The 
parliament flies above like an airplane, but the real problems are on the ground: 
everything that is local, is the ground.” (L.)  
The PJD councilors insist on the ethical dimension of this “mediation” carried out in the 
interest of the citizens and not motivated by personal interest: in order to economize the 
subsidy allocated to his district, a president of an arrondissement refused to change the 
furniture of his office when he installed himself in the new administrative centre whose 
construction he succeeded in finalizing. They highlight notably their availability, a quality 
that is at the heart of solving the daily problems of voters. “What concerns me the most 
is that citizens know that A. is here from 11 to 1:00 pm.” (A. PJD vice-president of the 
arrondissement, elected to the City council of Casablanca, July 2008) 
                                               
9 Through analogy with the concept of “personalized political mediation” used by Javier Auyero (2001) to 
underline the importance of emotion and ties within a clientelist relationship, which is not limited to the 
distribution of goods and/or services in exchange for votes.  
They enter thus into competition with elected representatives of other parties in order to 
win the demands and grievances of the citizens. The vice-president of the arrondissement 
mentioned above (A.) evokes with pride the tensions that characterized his relationship 
with the president of the arrondissement during many months after the 2003 elections: 
“There was a line in front of my office, many people came to see me. On the other hand, 
on the floor [in front of the president‟s office] it was empty, there was no one. My 
relationship with the president was difficult, he did not accept that.” 
The PJD councilors‟ “politics of doing” is articulated principally at the local level around 
two types of intermediaries: an institutional one, where the elected representatives play 
the role of translators of the administrative demands of voters, and a more political and 
social one, through which the elected representatives use the (scarce) local and political 
party resources which they have in order to reinforce the link with voters. Part of their 
work is similar to the “administrative support” that consists of collecting requests of 
citizens in order to orient and to facilitate their demands (to get the doctor to provide a 
death certificate, to obtain administrative documents, etc.) It consists of explaining and 
accelerating procedures, no matter their nature, by approaching the manager of the 
ceremony hall of the arrondissement, for instance, in order to reserve the hall and to ensure 
that the reservation is validated by the signature of the president or the vice-president, or 
by obtaining the authorization of the president for an association to meet in the cultural 
center of the arrondissement. The elected representatives of the PJD try equally, notably by 
personalizing their ties with the technical services of the City Council, to obtain services 
for their citizens. This is more or less easy according to whether the party is in the 
majority or in the opposition of the City Council: “I learned that things are not given [in 
the City Council], they are caught, they are taken” (A.)  
Negotiation is equally applied towards private enterprises in charge of the organization of 
public services (water, electricity, garbage collection). Elected PJD representatives 
emphasize the need to forge special ties with the representatives of these enterprises in 
order to obtain better results. Finally, personalized administrative mediation goes beyond 
the framework of decentralized administration to be deployed in the field of devolved 
administration (interventions addressed to the governor in order to accelerate certain 
steps namely for passports).  
Even if they use their status and their networks in all these cases, the elected PJD 
representatives insist on the fact that the services provided are not subject to favoritism 
but that they are “normal” services that citizens have the right to claim legitimately. Their 
action aims at optimizing public services provided within the bounds of the law, contrary 
to other local political patrons who sometimes circumvent the law to satisfy their voters 
(Zaki, 2008). However, these methods are contested: opponents of the party perceive 
them as the manifestation of electoral clientelism10. The government for its part 
reproaches the PJD parliamentarians for making too many written questions in 
parliament on “local issues”, and by doing so, for hindering the good functioning of 
institutions. 
In parallel to this administrative support of citizens, who witness the gradual integration 
of the party in normalized and regular local action networks, the municipal PJD 
councilors deploy social activities often in accordance with the dense associational fabric 
gravitating around the MUR. Most of those we have met preside over one or several 
associations, and equally work in a more informal way in order to “to provide service to 
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the citizen.” In the Mohammedia district, they often attend the weekly duty of the PJD 
parliamentarian. The former equally calls on militants or volunteer “sympathizers,” 
namely doctors and lawyers, who put their expertise to the service of voters. Networking 
is even more efficient since it relies on political party discipline presented as the “seal” of 
the party (words of the PJD mayor of Temara).  
Meanwhile, this investment in the localized political mediation is not sufficient for 
compensating the reduction in institutional resources of the municipalities, notably on 
the scale of districts-turned-arrondissements. The new constraints that the government of 
the cities has to face are all the more politically costly since they are ill-digested by the 
voters. The PJD president of the arrondissement of Yaacoub el Mansour in Rabat has thus 
edited a manual recapitulating the prerogatives of the arrondissement and those relevant to 
the city, partly in order to clear his name vis-à-vis citizens who expected services of him 
that he is not able (or no longer able) to provide. The elected PJD representatives 
willingly highlight the difficulties that they have in assuming in their principal mission of 
community work and “local community-based services” (“proximité”) Not only is it badly-
defined, it would hardly make sense due to the low amount of subsidy allocated annually 
to the arrondissements by the City Council: “the elected representatives of the 
arrondissement have lost hope, they do not dare to say that they are elected. (…) we do 
not do local community-based services ourselves, we manage small problems.” (A.)  
If the PJD in 2003 spoke in favor of unifying the municipalities, in virtue of the new 
Charter, a number of its elected representatives had to revise their position in light of 
facts. In their discourse, they set themselves up against “old elected representatives”, 
whom they accuse of wanting to regain de facto the tasks that were taken away from the 
arrondissements, thus serving to feed the vagueness of the Communal Charter.  
 
BETWEEN DISSIDENCE AND LOYALTY: ADAPTING TO THE RULES OF THE LOCAL 
PARTY GAME 
 
By presenting candidates only in a limited number of arrondissements in the big cities – 
even if they have been well elected – the PJD does not hold a sufficient majority to 
weigh in on local political decisions and even less so to redistribute resources of the 
territorial authorities. Since 2003, the president of the City Council of Casablanca 
monopolizes decision-making to the point of being considered the only master on board: 
he makes decisions with technical consultants (non-elected), he designates limited 
signatory authority by sector to members of the party and sets the order of the day on 
the agenda.  
Moreover, it is the wali and the governors who decide in the final instance. The strategy 
of political normalization engaged by the PJD explains without a doubt the ambivalence 
of the elected representatives‟ discourse regarding relations with the devolved 
administration. On the one hand, they pledge allegiance to the power of tutelage, notably 
on the question of budget approval, demanding the replacement of a priori control by an 
ex post control rendering them accountable. On the other hand, they reclaim the 
arbitration of the central authorities “It is not possible to manage a city like Casa without 
the intervention of concerned ministries in Rabat. Casa should not be left to deal with its 
own problems. It is a big city but its resources do not suffice for real development, the 
problem is that the ministers and the public funds do not intervene except in rural 
Morocco.” (L., PJD elected representative, Casablanca, July 2008). 
It follows that the PJD councilors seem sometimes tricked by the discrepancy between 
the symbolic effect that the 2003 elections represented and their limited capacity for 
holistic action. Their subscription to the rules of the local game saps in part their image 
as the porte-parole of protest. In Casablanca, for example, where it is the “spine” of the 
City Council (A., PJD elected representative, Sidi Bernoussi, Casablanca), the PJD has to 
compromise in order to prove its capacity to work in a team, far from the concept of 
“constructive criticism” adopted vis-à-vis the government from 1997 to 2002 (Zeghal, 
2005). Thus, it counts only one elected representative in the board of the council, holding 
the same title as more weakly represented parties, whereas other parties have two elected 
representatives. Indeed, it is the only party to preside over three commissions in the City 
Council and to have obtained five vice-presidencies of commissions, while these latter 
hold hardly any power. The party, however, has accepted to preside over an incompetent 
budget commission on the question of financial resources, which relieves it of its tasks in 
another commission. In Casablanca, where it has won in seven arrondissements, the party 
has obtained finally only the presidency of Sidi Bernoussi. According to several of the 
councilors interviewed, it would have thus ceded to the pressure of power.  
Nevertheless, the PJD elected representatives that we met display a strong loyalty 
towards their coalition in the city council. The oppositional stance is in fact associated 
with a certain political death at the local level: “In Morocco, in the municipality, no one 
chooses to be in the opposition. In the opposition, everything is blocked, we cannot do 
anything.” (L., PJD elected representative, Casablanca)  
The loyalty of the PJD councilors to the majority of the City Council enabled particularly 
the arrondissement of Sidi Bernoussi to obtain important financing from the City Council, 
upon which it now relies. The arrondissement would undoubtedly not have won this 
financing without the political concessions ceded by the party within the City Council. 
This financial manna permitted the completion of a cultural center and an administrative 
center work on which was started by the old municipal team more than ten years ago. 
And yet, the transfer of essential resources of the former municipalities-turned-
arrondissements to the City Council (that reduced the budget of 13 million dirhams of the 
district of Sidi Bernoussi before the reform to 500,000 dirhams after 2003) largely limits 
the capacity for action of the elected representatives of the arrondissement. 
These integration strategies of the majority of the City Council moreover can turn out to 
be politically costly for the party and lead to the disappointment, or even disaffection, of 
supporters. This was the case in the district of Casablanca-Anfa, where the majority of 
PJD militants campaigned for Abdelbari Zemzemi during the 2007 legislative elections. 
This former preacher ran under the colors of the Party of Renaissance and Virtue (PRV - 
hizb al-nahda wa al-fadîla), while he had contributed largely to the establishment of the PJD 
in Anfa during the 2002 legislative elections. His candidature aimed in particular to 
oppose the common list presented by the PJD and the Party of Citizens‟ Forces (PCF - 
hizb al-quwwât al-muwâtana) – an alliance that formed part of the PJD‟s policy of 
normalization implemented by its management. While Zemzemi arrived in second, the 
candidate of the PCF was not elected: his defeat constituted an important setback for the 
PJD in a district where it obtained two elected representatives in 2002 (Wasif, 2009). 
Entry into the city councils, however, did not totally blunt the capacity of the PJD to 
mobilize its supporters. During the last legislative elections of 2007, the party won in 
Casablanca with high results in six of the eight districts in which it ran.11 In Rabat, it also 
won to the detriment of the USFP, another opposition party in the City Council 
(Bennani Chraïbi, 2008; Salgon, 2008).  
 
PROFESSIONALS OF URBAN GOVERNMENT? 
 
While the 2003 Communal Charter requires candidates to prove a minimum level of 
education , equivalent to that of primary education (article 28), the PJD prides itself in an 
elitist ethic of political action. If party devotion lies at the source of accreditation of the 
party, the choice of candidates is also a function of other criteria guaranteeing the 
“competence” (kafâ’a) of elected PJD representatives, and essentially focusing on the 
professional and sociological profile of individuals: “We have managers, doctors, people 
who know how to talk…not illiterate people. We have graduates and well-known people, 
in order to represent the party well. We have to be representative of the party. We cannot 
choose just anybody to represent the PJD.” (A.) 
Several political science studies point to an “entrepreneurisation” of political 
representation. Despite the rise to power of businessmen and local notables on the 
electoral stage, notably to the detriment of representatives from the educational sphere 12, 
the PJD recruits more from the civil service than from private domain. Teachers 
represent a quarter of the PJD elected representatives in the City Council, while they 
represent 10,28% of all parties on average (Elyagoubi , 2005) : time management is easier 
in the civil service, while private enterprises, whose logic is incompatible with the 
availability required by party discipline, penalize the repetitive absence of their 
employees. Several elected representatives mention in this regard that they could not 
have taken up their posts were it not for a decree in 2005 facilitating the anticipated 
retirement with the aim of relieving the civil service. If teachers do not have at their 
disposal their own resources to redistribute, as do local notables, their profession allows 
them to mobilize and build up the loyalty of militants or future militants, to take part in 
trustful relations and in “local popular practices” (Mischi, 2003, p. 91), to equally develop 
a multiplicity of relations with the party through the development of sports associations, 
night classes etc…  
In 2003, the PJD elected municipal councilors who for the most part had hardly any 
political experience. The candidates were chosen in a rather deliberate way outside the 
ranks of party parliamentarians, in order to “widen the political camp for many 
militants.” (W. PJD elected representatives, Casablanca, July 2008) In a common “rejet 
de la brigue” (Bennani Chraïbi, 2005, p. 119), the elected representatives recall that they 
did not choose to present themselves or to be representatives, but rather the militants 
selected the candidates of the party through their vote. The deliberation of the local 
section is determining for the make-up of the lists13: the electoral adventure thus escapes 
suspicion of personal ambition while it seems to be mainly a matter of devotion. 
                                               
11 Dans ces 8 circonscriptions casablancaises, le PJD a recueilli 72 980 voix contre 47 272 pour le second 
parti, le Parti de l‟Istiqlal. 
12 See the contribution by M. Bennani Chraïbi to this volume. 
13. Des frictions portant sur la constitution de certaines listes aux législatives de 2007 montrent cependant 
que le bureau central peut imposer ses choix contre l‟avis des militants locaux (comme par exemple à 
Casablanca-Anfa, où le PJD s‟est associé au Parti des forces citoyennes).  
The elected PJD representatives are characterized notably by their youth, presented as a 
pledge of candor and dynamism. In 2003, the average age of the new elected local 
representatives in Casablanca was 47.2 years; it was 39.8 years for the elected 
representatives of the PJD. Political inexperience paradoxically appears as a guarantee of 
efficiency: deprived of any past experience in the arena of power, the newly PJD elected 
adopt more easily the attitude of elected representatives of the arrondissement. 
In parallel, the party demands expertise and professionalisation in local governance. After 
devoting itself to the issue of reforming the Charter in the 2003 parliament, it militates 
henceforth for reform of the electoral law, by defending notably the abolishment of the 
threshold of representation in order to avoid the balkanization of City Councils and 
encourage the formula “a city =a party”. The PJD declares itself the porte-parole of the 
local space and pays particular attention to the specialization of its representatives. To 
that goal, the Association of the local elected PJD representatives (jam‘iyya muntakhabîn al-
‘adâla wa al-tanmiya) organizes training sessions for elected representatives of the party. It 
is presided over by the emblematic mayor of Temara, supported by the vice-president of 
the City Council of Casablanca, in charge of urbanism.  
More than an individual professionalization (the elected PJD representatives have a 
difficulty in living off politics and highlight the material challenges that they face), it is an 
institutional professionalisation that is at stake. The latter operates through a 
rationalization of political work where the individual makes way for the party and rely on 
a distinct militant devotion.  
The ethos of professionalization can be equally found in the division of labor between the 
elected PJD representatives according to their experience in the professional world. It 
goes without saying, for instance, that the management of finance issues is assigned to a 
graduate of financial economics and business management from Toulouse. On the other 
hand, the management of the Lydec file by an aesthetic surgeon seemed less directly 
evident and provoked amused but also admiring remarks by party colleagues. At the 
same time, it shows the importance and the prestige accorded to the degree itself: “At 
this level of studies, we can understand everything,” confirmed the elected representative 
in question. 
Political party discipline and specialization are equally manifested in the coordination of 
work: “When we interfere in the Council, we interfere with knowledge of the cause, it is 
a responsibility. We prepare the interventions, we coordinate among each other.” (A. 
elected PJD representative, Vice-president of the arrondissement, elected to the City 
Council of Casablanca). 
The integration of the PJD in the local political game thus contributed to its 
normalization. At the same time, the forms of authority deployed by its representatives, 
as well as the repertoires of action they draw upon, renew the rules of local power. The 
elected PJD representatives claim the status of novice and the professionalization of their 
role at the same time. They present themselves as generous notables engaged in causes 
where only the interests of their voters matter, while also donning the garb of disciplined 
servants of the party, devoted to the interest of the party machine. Through their outsider 
discourse and their rhetoric of renewal and of political virginity14, they advocate for a 
representation of the cities at the same time virtual – by trying to explain what the power 
of the party would be if they had not limited their candidatures – and virtuous – the 
                                               
14. « Pour une commune efficace et un développement complet », programme du PJD pour les élections 
communales de 2003.  
accredited candidatures are “transparent” and the candidates “competent,” capable of 
inventing a dynamic political life and of engaging citizens in decision-making15. 
Combining mediation activities, non-profitable practices and moral representations of 
the authority, the elected PJD representatives seek to impose themselves as new “social 
authorities” in politics16. This new forms of notables paradoxically associates militant 
trajectories and territory base, professionalization and vocation. But the comparison with 
more classical notable figures ends at the threshold of a/the strong dependency that links 
them to the party.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The election of Abdelilah Benkirane to the post of secretary-general during the PJD 
congress in July 2008 created surprise on the outside as well as in the heart of the party. 
The pundits effectively banked on a new victory for Saâd Eddine El Othmani (elected 
for the first time in April 2004), who embodied the strategy of normalization and 
political integration of the party. The new leader chosen by the militants is known for his 
polemical declarations, sometimes judged as intolerant and populist. Meanwhile, he is still 
considered a moderate. Indeed, he hopes to “moralize political life”, but the application 
of values issued from the Islamic referential that he invokes has to contribute primarily 
to the fight against corruption17. On the national as well as on the local level, the 
application of an Islamic ethic has to contribute to the reinvention of a political morale 
based on consensual values; a morale which the Islamists advocate to be the only ones to 
implement through their party discipline. 
The experience of the PJD in the municipalities since 2003 shows an organized and 
disciplined political group, which, however, promotes sometimes contradictory strategies 
and watchwords: budget management versus political reform, dissidence versus 
participation. The PJD councilors, by presenting themselves as the local elected 
representatives par excellence, embody new political figures and follow the royal command 
and the international calls for decentralization. Faced with the limited means offered by 
local institutions, the members of the party push to rethink the technical and political 
modalities of the municipalities.  
The elections held in June 2009 renewed the process. The PJD managed to field 
candidates in 40% of all electoral districts, including all cities and some rural 
communities. The party announced its goal to be first18. In Meknès, established as a 
laboratory for PJD management, electors disowned the party and the PJD was beaten. 
The General Secretary of the Modernity and Authenticity Party,a new party founded by 
Fouad Ali El Himma, a close collaborator of Mohammed VI and a direct competitor of 
                                               
15. Ibid..  
16. Voir la présentation éditoriale du dossier « Trajectoires de la notabilité, I. Pratiques et stratégies », Politix, 
17 (65), 2004, p. 12.  
17. Florence Beaugé, « Abdelilah Benkirane, chef du parti islamiste PJD, veut “moraliser la vie politique au 
Maroc” », Le Monde, 6 août 2008.  
18 Declaration of M. Benkirane French press service, AFP. June 6, 2009. 
 
the PJD in the Meknès poll, explained, “The PJD was sanctioned because the party had 
management Meknès poorly. Moroccans saw for themselves that the PJD did not have a 
monopoly on virtue”19. If the PJD is the sixth party in terms of the total number of seats 
controlled (out of a total 1513 seats) it remains the strongest party among the large cities 
(745 seats). In other words, party development continues to be focused on a strategy of 
winning among the kingdom‟s urban circumscriptions. 
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